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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, Case No. C-78-5035 
Defendant-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 
Third-Party Intervenor. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, 
UTAH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by a private citizen against the State 
of Utah challenging the lawfulness of legislation enacted by 
the 1977-78 Utah Legislature and further challenging the right 
of persons employed by boards of education to serve in the Utah 
Legislature. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment holding that the laws enacted by the 1977-78 Utah Legislature 
and that the revenues collected were lawful and that educators 
could not serve in the Utah legislature. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Amicus requests that this Court find that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, that 
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the issues were improperly brought in the district court and 
that educators are not constitutionally prohibited from serv-
ing in the legislature. 
STATE!lENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 9, 1978, Lynn A. Jenkins filed a Com-
plaint against the State of Utah alleging, among other things, 
that employees of the Utah public schools had been elected and 
had served in the 1977-78 state legislatures and that Article 
VI, section 6 of the Constitution of Utah provides in part that 
"No person holding any public office of profit or trust under 
authority of. .this state, shall be a member of the Legislature; 
The prayer for relief requested: 
1. That "All laws passed by the 1977-78 Utah State Legisla-
ture shall be declared null and void." 
2. That "All money collected by virtue of laws which are 
declared null and void shall be returned to the people." 
3. That the Le~islature shall certify all their membership 
to be constitutionally correct. Those members of the Legislature 
which cannot certify shall forfeit any and all benefit which the 
office of Legislator holds. 
4. "For costs and disbursements of this action." 
5. "For such other and further relief as the court seems 
just in the premises." 
Following the State of Utah's Hotion for Summary Judgment 
held August 30, 1978, the district court held that the la\,'S e:.-
acted by the 1977-78 legislature were valid, that lhc revenues 
collected were lawfully collected, but that sehoul tcac:cl'~S ,1:c.: 
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school administrators could not serve in the Utah legislature. 
The State of Utah appealed the District Court's judgment 
that school teachers and administrators cannot lawfully serve 
in the Utah Legislature, although Amicus is unable to understand 
how the State of Utah has become a proper party defendant to 
represent educators whose right to be elected by the voters of 
Utah has been challenged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING BEFORE THE COURTS. 
Mr. Jenkins alleged that he is a resident of Salt Lake County. 
Mr. Jenkins does not allege that he is a taxpayer. There is no 
allegation that Mr. Jenkins is represented in the Utah legislature 
by a person employed by a public school or that his voting privi-
leges are affected by the candidacy of such person. 
59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, §30 provides: 
Public wrongs or neglect or breach of 
public duty generally cannot be redressed at 
a suit in the name of an individual or individuals 
whose interest in the right asserted does not 
differ from that of the public generally, or who 
suffers injury only in common with the public 
generally, and not peculiar to himself, even, it 
seems, though his loss is greater in degree, 
unless such right of action is given by statute. 
The broad general principle is asserted that 
in the absence of a statute imposing liability, 
an action will not lie in behalf of an individual 
who has sustained a prlvate injury by reason of the 
neglect of a public corporation to perform a 
public duty. When the duty of taking appropriate 
action for the enforcement of a statute is entrusted 
solely to a named public officer, private citizens 
cannot intrude upon his functions. In cases of 
purely public concern and in actions for wrongs 
against the public, whether actually committed or 
only apprehended, the remedy, whether civil or 
criminal, is as a general rule by a prosecution 
-3-
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instituted by the state in its political character, 
or by some officer authorized by law to act in its 
behalf, or by some of those local agencies created by 
the state for the arrangement as may be entrusted to 
them by law. If a mere public right is to be vindicated, 
or enforcement or evasion of a law is to be restrained, 
the action should be brought by the attorney general or 
district attorney, or some public officer or body espec-
ially charged with the duty of enforcing the law. The 
right of a citizen or taxpayer to restrain acts of pub-
lic officials is in some instances granted or regulated 
by statute, but ordinarily, and in the absence of sta-
tute, private citizens or corporations must possess 
something more than a con®on concern for obedience to 
law before they will be permitted to maintain injunction 
suits against public officers. A private person who 
wishes to restrain an official different in character 
from that sustained by the public generally, although 
there is an exception in regard to taxpayers' action. 
* * * 
It is, however, only when the injury from the 
violation of a public duty is general and public in 
its effect, and no private right, in contradistinction 
to the rights of the rest of the public, is violated, 
that individuals are precluded from bringing private 
suit for the violation of their individual rights. 
When an individual or a private citizen suffers an in-
jury peculiar to himself from a public wrong which is 
not sustained by the public in general, he may sue in 
his own name and for his own benefit for such wrong. 
In Jenkins v. State of lJtah, Plaintiff does not allege that 
he ':las any special interest to protect or that he has suffen'J 
any unique injury. lndeed, he appears to seek redress of a prG-
blem reserved by the Constltution of Utah to th~ Legisl3ture. 
See Point IV below. 
74 Am Jur 2d, Taxpayers Actions, §46 orovides: 
A taxpayer may not maintain a petition for 
declaratory judgment to question the eliqibility 
of 3 candidate for, or thn title of, an oFfice. 
An action rclatinq to election r:t:.ttcrs C(lnqot l>t.' ~alnt,,tt: 
by one ·,,hose Jnterest c_s onl:· that of the r"Jbl o::: dCncr."lll·: in 
-.)-
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the absence of a statute authorizing the action. Yett v. Cook, 
281 s .w. 837 (Tex. 1926). 
A private citizen may not maintain an election contest in 
his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer. Freemen v. Felts, 
344 S.W. 2d 550 (Tenn. 1961); Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 
(5th Cir. 1972) cert. den. 410 U.S. 910 (1973). 
The right to contest office of mayor held by the apparent 
winner lies only in the defeated candidate. Marden v. City of 
l~aterville, 226 A.2d 369 (Me. 1967). 
In Porter v. Bainbridge, 465 F. Supp. 83 (D.C.Ind. 1975) the 
court held that the challenge to the election of a person to the 
Indiana House of Representatives was "in essence a contest between 
two opposing candidates for a section in the Indiana House of 
Representatives. .accordingly plaintiffs Porter and Zinuners, 
who claim an interest in the case only in their capacity as 
voters, lack standing to maintain the action under the principles 
of Schlesinger v. Reservists' Committee to Stop lvar, 418 U.S. 208 
.and Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 .... " 
The issue before the court is really a back-door effort to 
bring an election contest of the right and qualification of a 
certain class of persons to serve in the Utah legislature. Elec-
tion contests are regulated by the Constitution or by statute. 
26 Am Jur 2d, Elections, §31. Section 20-15-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, sets forth nine grounds to contest the "election of any person 
to any public office, or in the case of a primary, to a nomination." 
Subsection (2) of section 20-15-1 provides that an election may be 
-5-
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contested "When incumbent was not eligible to the office at the 
time of the election." The pleadings in Jenkins v. State of Utah 
do not allege and there are no facts before the court showing that 
there are candidates for election to the state legislature not 
eligible to secure as state legislators at the time of their 
election. Moreover, the statute clearly indicates that the con-
test must be brought after the election. In the Jenkins case, 
the matter was brought before the election. 
POINT II 
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION AS THE 
"STATE OF UTAH" HAS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IN THIS CASE AND THERE \'/ERE NO PROPER 
PARTY DEFENDANTS. 
Amicus submits that the persons whose interests to this 
matter would be affected, i.e., educators, have never been 
made a party. Moreover, although the State of Utah by and 
through the office of the Attorney General have not raised 
the issue, the State of Utah is neither a proper party nor 
may it be a party defendant. 
Unfortunately, the impetus to this action is a $50,000,000 
bond issue which appears to have been stalled as a result of 
this action. Amicus submits that lf the validity of the bends 
are at issue, the proper course of action would be to have the 
governor sue the state treasurer raising the issues raised in 
the Jenkins suit. 
A. The State of Utah is sovereign and is irmnune to process. 
Rule 4 (e) ( 9) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provldc:s t 1,at 
service of process may be had on the "State of ~_~tah, in suc'l 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state .... " 
There is no law authorizing the type of action which was brought 
against the State of Utah by Mr. Jenkins. Accordingly, the dis-
trict court acquired no jurisdiction on which to enter a judgment. 
In Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964) this 
Court held that the activities, operations and contracts of state 
government have sovereign immunity. While the attorney general 
has entered his appearance in Jenkins v. State of Utah, his appear-
ance does not constitute a waiver of immunity. In Bailey Servlce 
and Supply Corp. v. State By and Through State Road Commission, 
533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975) this court held that only the leglslature 
could waive sovereign immunity. The Court may take judicial notice 
of lack of jurisdiction and improper parties. Bruno v. Kenosha, 
412 u.s. 507 (1974). 
B. Rule l7(a) in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest." In this case only the State of Utah was 
served or made a defendant. Subsequently, the Office of Legis-
lative Counsel intervened, but no teacher or school administrator 
was ever made a party. Horeoever, not until the State's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, at the direction of the trial court judge, 
did thl' [-'rayer for relief becorr.L' a"'ended to request a decision 
-7-
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on whether or not educators may serve in the legislature.l/ 
Although the State has not previously objected to jurisdic-
tion for the reasons suggested in this Point II, it is submitted 
that this Court may take notice of the lack of jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictional defects can be raised at any time. 26 Am Jur 2d, 
Elections, §328. Bruno v. City of Kenosha, 412 U.S. 507 (1974). 
POINT III 
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
ARE NOT OFFICERS IHTHIN THE MEANING 
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 6, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
No person holding any public office of profit or 
trust under authority of the United States, or of this 
State shall be a member of the Legislature; provided, 
that appointments in the State Militia, and the offices 
of notary public, justice of the peace, United States 
commissioner, and postmaster of the fourth class, shall 
not within the meaning of this section be considered 
offices of profit or trust. 
A. This Court has never decided whether a school teacher 
holds an "office" of profit or trust within the meaning of the 
constitutional language. 
1/ At page 16 of the Transcript the court states, "Now, I don't 
understand about- I am not sure I understand Paragraph 3." "Legis·-
lature shall certify all their membership to be constitutionally 
correct." I1t page 17 of the Transcript the Court states, "And 
with reaard to the fourth issue, while as I have indicated I have 
some do~bts as to what the Supreme Court will decide, I am going to 
hold that a school teacher does hold an office of profit trust-
or an educator-and therefore cannot be seated in the Legislature." 
Plaintiff's fourth prayer for relief was for "costs and disburse-
ments of this action." Even if an educator had received a copy 
of the Jenkins Complaint the educator would not have known that 
the Complaint requested that educators b<? determined inellgiblEc 
to serve in the legislature. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In an unreported case styled Davie v. Messinger, No. 8272 
(1954) this Court dismissed an action brought by the defeated 
candidate for a seat in the Utah House of Representatives. Davie 
had challenged the qualification of Messinger on the ground that 
Messinger was the clerk of the board of education of the Beaver 
County School District. The pleadings show that Mr. Messinger 
had alleged grounds as to why his occupation as clerk of the 
school board did not disqualify him. First, he argued he was 
not holding an office of profit or trust. Second, the Legisla-
ture was the sole and exclusive judge of the qualifications of 
its members. Unfortunately, the minute entry of the court does 
not indicate the basis of its decision to dismiss Davies petition.~/ 
In Eliason v. Miller et al., No. 13130, (Utah 1972), an unreported 
case, petitioner, the defeated candidate in an election for member-
ship on the Utah State School Board, sought to prohibit the certi-
fication of Steven L. Garrett from serving on the Utah State School 
Board for the reason that Mr. Garrett held an incompatible office, 
i.e., he was an educator employed by the Iron County School District 
at the time of his election and therefore the office to which he ~ad 
2/ A clerk of a board of education is an office established by 
statute, §53-6-3, Uta~ Code Annotated, is bonded, Id. at §53-6-4 and 
takes an oath of office. Id. at §53-6-6. It woul~appear under the 
criteria below suggested byAmicus that Hessinger was an "officer". 
of the board. Accordingly, the Court must have concluded that Artl-
cle VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah reserved to the Legls-
lature the jurisdiction to determine the election and qualification 
of the membership. 
-9-
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been elected was incompatible with his office as an educator. 
Mr. Garrett argued that a school teacher is not an "officer" 
but rather an "employee" and that constitutional limitations 
regarding eligibility for public office should be strictly 
construed in favor of eligibility. This Court dismissed Mrs. 
Eliason's petition for EXtra Ordinary 1\Tri t. 
Amicus submits that a school teacher is not an office of 
trust or profit within the meaning of the Constitution. At 
35 \-lords and Phrases, Public Officers, page 405 there are many 
cases holding that a school trustee, a member of the school 
board or a school committee are public officers. There is a 
split of authority as to whether superintendents are public 
officers or employees. Compare Rowan v. Board of Education of 
Logan County, 24 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1943) with State ex rel. 
Harvey v. Stanley, 138 So. 845 (La. 1931). 
In Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344 (Pa.l938) the court held 
that a school teacher is not a public officer within the mean-
ing of the constitutional provision prohibiting the creation of 
any office the appointment to which shall be for a longer term 
than of any "public office" after his election or appointment 
since the duties of school teachers are not created by statute, 
but rise strictly from their employment contracts. It is generally 
held that a school teacher is an employee and not a public of~Jccr, 
Gelson v. Berry, 250 N.Y.S. 577 (1931); Regents (.)f University S:,·s-
tem of Georgia v. Blanton, 176 S.E. 673 (Ga .. Z\pp.l934); Co[)l_c_·_·-
Metal Tp. School District, 3 Cumb. 43 (Pa. 1955); 
and School Districts, §154, P.97l; 75 l1.L.R. 1347. 
78 C.J.S. :Cch>OL 
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B. The courts have distinguished an officer from an 
employee. 
In Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 383 S.W.2d 
806 (Tex.Civ.App.l964), the Court held that the determining 
factor which distinguishes public officers from employees is 
whether any sovereign function of government is conferred on 
the individual to be exercised by him for the public largely 
independent of the control of others. 
In Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226, 469 P.2d 497 (1970), 
this court considered the definition of "civil office." It 
noted that Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil office" as: 
An office, not merely military in its nature, 
that pertains to the exercise of the powers of author-
ity of civil government. Requisites are continuity, 
creation and definition of powers and duties by Consti-
tution or Legislature, or their authority, possession 
or governmental power, and independence unless controlled 
by superior officers. 
The Court then analyzed the creation and membership of the 
legislative council as follows: 
1. The Council was created by the Legislature. 
2. Members had a definite tenure, to wit, until 
the convening of the next regular session of the Legis-
lature following the appointment. 
3. The duties of the Council are set forth by the 
Legislature. 
4. The Council is given power to administer oaths, 
issue subpoenas, compel attendance of witness and to 
take testimony. 
5. The Council performs its work according to 
-11-
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its own rules and regulations independent of any 
supervision. 
6. The Council possesses governmental powers. 
Based on the foregoing test, the Court concluded that mem-
bership on the Council constituted holding a public office. 
Educators, by contrast, possess almost none of the foregoing. 
The position of teachers is not created by statute. Section 
53-4-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
Board of education of local school districts 
may enter into written contracts for the employ-
ment of personnel for terms not to exceed five years .... 
In Brough v. Board of Education, 23 Utah 2d 174, 460 P.2d 
336 (1969) and 23 Utah 2d 353, 463 P.2d 567 (1970) this court 
made clear that a school teacher is entirely subject to the 
control and direction of the board of education and the district 
superintendent and that a school teacher who attempts to centro-
vert the policies of the school district may be terminated for 
i:-csc.illo:cdination absent a showing that the board's action was not 
School teachers do not have definite terms of office, but 
may acquire tenure according to the policies of local boards of 
education. Abbott v. Board of I:ducation 558 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1977). 
Nor do teachers and lov1er level "administrators" take or subscr ~.be 
to an oath of office or post a bond. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that school teachers ana 
school administrators are not officers of thr_' State of r·cah cr 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the school district. Indeed, if school teachers were 
found to be officers, they could not be fired except by a 
vote of four or more members of a five member board of edu-
cation. Section 53-6-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
C. Article IV, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in part that: 
All officers made elective or appointive by the 
Constitution or by the laws made in pursuance thereof, 
before entering upon the duties of their respective 
offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath 
or affirmation. 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the criteria of taking 
an oath of office was foremost in the minds of the drafters of 
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah. Article VI, 
Section 6 prohibits persons holding a public office of profit 
or trust under the United States or the State of Utah from serv-
ing in the Utah Legislature. Excepted from that prohibition are 
appointments in the state militia, notaries public, justices of 
the peace, United States commissioners and postmasters of the 
fourth class. 
Pursuant to the Territorial Laws of Utah, 1888, commissioners 
and notaries public were required to take and subscribe to the 
oath of office. Territorial Laws of Utah, 1888, §§225, 227 and 
2 31. Justices of the peace were elected and had to take the oath 
of office. Id. at §162. 
The officers of the state militia were appointed by the governor, 
Id. at §1436, except that field officers of battalions and regiments 
v.·ere elected. Id. ~t §1439. All commissioned officers were required 
to "take and subscribe the required oath. Id. at §1440. 
-13-
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Section 1854 of the Territorial Laws, p.54 provides in 
part: 
.no person holding a commission or appoint-
ment under the United States, except postmasters, 
shall be a member of the Legislat.ive Assembly, or 
shall hold any office under the government of any 
Territory. 
Amicus submits under the principal of noscitur a sociis, 
the five offices listed in section 6 of Article VI of the 
Constitution of Utah show that the word "office" is intended 
to mean persons appointed by the president of the United 
States, the governor of Utah or holding elected office all 
of whom took an oath of office and filed a bond. Moreover, 
the offices of each was expressly established by statute as 
an "office." 
Amicus submits that given the legislative background, edu-
cators were not intended to be included within the prohibition 
of Article VI, §6 of the Constitution of Utah as they are net 
appointed by the president of the United States, the governor 
of Utah and they are not elected by the people. 
The lower court entirely relied on Mo~3ghan v. School District 
No. l, Clackamas.~ounty, 315 P.2d 797 (Ore.l977) for the propDsltlOr 
that an educator holds an office of profit or trust. Y:::t l''o~~ "''l'L, 
Supra at 315 P.2d 80l holds: 
We are inhibited from passing upon ~r. Monaghan's 
qualificat1ons as a member of the legislature. That 
power reposes exclusively in the branch of the lcnis-
lative assembly to w''lich he was electccl to serve. 
(Oregon Constitution, Art. IV, §2) .... 
-14-
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Article IV, §2 of the Oregon Constitution is substantially the 
same as Article VI, §10 of the Constitution of Utah. 
D. Article VI, Section 6, of the Constitution of Utah is 
a limitation of the right of otherwise qualified persons to 
serve in the Utah Legislature. It is also a limitation of the 
right of the people to vote for the person they believe can 
best represent them in the legislature. In State v. DuBuque, 
413 P.2d 972(1966), the court held that where eligibility for 
public office is in question and where the constitution and the 
context of the language permits, those provisions should be 
construed so as to preserve eligibility. 
In Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964) 
this court held that: 
The foundation and structure which give it 
(government) life depend upon participation of the 
citizenry in all aspects of it's operation. On 
patriotic occasions we hear a great deal of oratory 
declaiming how precious is the right and how essen-
tial is the duty to vote for the candidate of one's 
choice. The emphasis is placed on the first clause-
the right to vote; and the second clause-for the 
candidate of one's choice, is minimized or forgotten. 
Lost sight of is the fact that the two rights are 
correlative, and that to make the first meaningful, 
the second must also be assured. Furthermore, the 
natural corollary of the right to vote is the right 
to seek and to serve in public office. 
Petitioner submits that the issue of whether or not an ed~-
cator should serve the people in the Utah legislature is a 
political questlon. If the public does not want educators to 
represent them, they can vote for other candidates. Candidates 
for the legislature have ''full exposure to public view, and. 
-15-
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have full exposure to the elective process. Months before 
suit was filed they had announced their candidacies for 
office. They had to run before and obtain the approval of 
the conventions of their respective parties. They were 
obliged to run in the public primaries against formidable 
opponents; and must face candidates of the opposing party 
in the general election. All of this with the public fully 
aware of all of the circumstances so they are free to approve 
or disapprove what the candidates have done." Shields v. 
Toronto, 16 Utah 2d at 65. Amicus submits that the issues 
raised by Mr. Jenkins should be resolved by the electorate, 
not by the courts. 
E. The Court's attention is directed to Utah Attorney 
Opinion 72-038 which states in part: 
An opinion of the Attorney General issued Jan. 
10, 1961 and nu~her 61-006, covers this question: 
"It should be noted that what is prohibited by 
Sec. 6, Art. IV is the holding of 'public office 
of profit or tru3t,' while serving in the legisla-
ture. .In an earlier opinion of the Attorney 
General, Feb. 29, 1944, it was said that the con-
stitutional prohibition applies only to officers 
and not to employees. Although this is probably 
more general than intended, it is essentially cor-
rect. Unless t.he person holds 'an office' as dis-
tinct from mere employnent the proh1bition of Art. 
VI is inapplicable. .crnployntent as a te<1chcr. 
would not be within t~e constitutional prohibition. 
From this we must conclude in aeneral terms that tho 
consitutional prohibition set ~ut in Art. VI, Sec. 6 
of our State Constitution applies only to persons 
holding public office, which based on the facts of each 
case, must be distingulshed fror.1 mere employees." 
Under the foregoing we see no compelling reason why a 
school teacher cannot be a rT.embcr of the Lcc,islaturr.· a:.; 
far as 1\rt. VT, Sec. Go:': t!E• t'l:lh Constitution is 
-16-
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concerned. 
F. Amicus further anticipates that this court will be 
urged on the basis of Monaghan, supra, to find that educa-
tors who are elected to the legislature are not eligible to 
continue their employment as educators. It is submitted 
that this issue was not raised by the plaintiff in the court 
below and it should not now be considered by this court for 
the first time on appeal. State By and Through Road Commission, 
27 Utah 2d 295, 482 P.2d 702 (1972); In re Ekker's Estate, 19 
Utan 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967). 
Moreover, amicus submits that Utah educators occupy a 
relationship to the executive department substantially differ-
ent than that of Oregon educators. 
Before this court addresses the issues raised by Monaghan, 
there should be proper parties and the issues should be fully 
developed. In distinguishing Monaghan, the Utah Attorney Gen-
er3l suggests among other reasons: 
Only if its reasoning is compelling then 
would it influence a similiar decision in 
Utah. It could be argued that there is, 
in fact, more weicht in the "unwritten 
precedent," which-tacitly endorses the 
employment of legislators as public 
school teachers. Op. ,'\ttj". Gen. 72-038. 
-17-
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G. \~hile it was not raised in the pleadings below, 
Amicus anticJ.pates th:ot it ::1ay be urged that Article VI, 
§6 of the Constitution of Utah is a general prohibition 
on conflicts of interest. Had the drafters of the con-
stitution intended a prohibition on conflicts of interest, 
the language would have extended to include employees of 
the state and would not have excepted the five named classes 
of officers. It has been suggested that retired educators 
have a conflict of interest and should not serve in the leg-
islature. There are 76,000 retirees participating in the 
Utah State Retirement program. There are at least 20,000 
persons employed by higher education. Amicus submits that 
any effort to extend the exclusions of Article VI, §6 of the 
Constitution of Utah to conflicts of interest would eliminate 
from eligibility for service in the Utah legislature a group 
of people large in number than the number of votes case for 
the candidate elected governor in Utah in 1976. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT IV 
EACH HOUSE OF THE LEGISLATURE IS THE EXCLUSIVE 
HOUSE TO DETERHI~E THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION 
OF ITS MEMBERS. 
Amicus respectfully submits that the courts do not have 
jurisdiction to decJ.de t~e qualifications or election of mem-
bers to the Utah legislature. Article VI, §10 of the Consti-
tution of Ctah provides in part: 
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"Each house shall be the judge of the 
election and qualifications of its members. 
This issue was set to rest early in Utah law in the case 
of Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 Pac. 899 (1901). There 
an action was brought contesting the election of the respondent 
to the office of state senator. A demurrer to the complaint 
was sustained by the trial court on the ground that the court 
had no jurisdiction to try and determine the same. The Supreme 
Court in a decision per Justice Baskin, with Chief Justice 
Miner and Justice Bartch concurring, upheld the lower court's 
decision explaining: 
The powers conferred upon each house of the legis-
lature under section 10, art. 6, are forbidden to be 
exercised, by article 5, §l, by any person in the 
exercise of powers belonging to a different depart-
ment of the government. Neither is it anywhere declared 
in the constitution that the power conferred upon each 
house to judge of the election and the qualifications 
of its members is otherwise than prohibitory in respect 
to the other departments. Chief Justice Bartch, in 
the opinion in the case of Kimball v. City of Grantsville 
19 Utah, 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628, said, "The 
apportionment of distince power to one department of 
itself implies an inhibition against its exercise by 
either of the other departments." It therefore follows 
that the power is e~clus~vely lodged in each house of 
t!1e lcglslature, and the roGrts have no jurisaict1on to 
trv and determine contests for seats in the legislature. 
* * * 
The power thus given to the houses of the legis-
lature is a judicial power, and each house acts in a 
judicial capacity when it exerts it. The express 
vesting of a judicial power in a particular case so 
closely and vitally affecting the body to whom that 
power is given takes it out of the general judicial 
power, which is at the same time, in pursuance of a 
general plan that has reaard in each part to every 
other part, bestowed upon another body; both bodies 
being contemporaneous in origin, and equal in dignity, 
degree, and proposed duration." The senate, under. 
the provisions of the constitution, has the excluslve 
jurisdiction to trv, deter~ine, and declare which of 
the parties to thl~ action has been legally elected. 
-19-
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This concept is not unique to Utah, but rather, constitutes 
the generally accepted approach by other jurisdictions. 
Each house is the sole judge of the election and qualification 
of its members. Burge v. Tibor, 397 P.2d 235 (Idaho 1964); Harris 
v. Shanahan, 387 P.2d 771 (Kan. 1963). 
The state constitutional provision that each House shall 
judge the qualifications, elections and returns of its own mem-
bers deprives the state courts of jurisdiction to decide contests 
for state legislative offices. Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466 
(Nev. 1964); In re McGee, 226 P.2d 1, (Cal. 1951), remittitur 
amended 229 P. 2d 780 (Cal. 1951); Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 
1, Clackamas County, 315 P.2d 797 (Ore. 1957). 
72 Am Jur 2d, States, §44 provides: 
The constitutions of most, if not all, 
of the states contain provisions to the effect 
that each house in the state legislature shall 
be the judge of the election and qualifications 
of its own members. Such a declaration is a 
grant of power and constitutes each house the 
ultimate tribunal c3 to the qualifications o: 
lts own members. The two houses acting con-
jointly do not decide, but each house acts for 
itself and by itself, and from its decision 
there is no appeal, not even to the two houses. 
This power is not exhausted when once it has 
been exercised and a member admitted to his 
seat; it is, on the contrary, a continuous power, 
and at all times during the term of office, each 
house is empowered to pass on the present qualifi-
cations of its own members. The power extends to 
determining the absence of disqualifications, as 
well as the presence of qualifications. 
* * * 
-20-
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It is well settled that a constitutional 
provision of this kind vests the legislature 
with sole and exclusive power over the matters 
covered and deprives the courts of jurisdiction. 
And any action or decision taken by a house of 
the legislature in the exercise of this power 
is final and conclusive and not subject to 
review or revision by the courts. 
To the same effect, see 81A C.J.S. States §44 and 107 A.L.R. 
209, which concludes: 
The constitutions of most if not all, 
of the states contain provisions similar 
to Art. 1, §5, of the Federal Constitution, 
to the effect that each house of the state 
legislature shall be the judge of the election 
and qualifications of its own members. And it 
is well settled that such a provision vests the 
legislature with sole and exclusive power in 
this regard, and deprives the courts of juris-
diction of those matters. 
This concept remains in force even where the courts may feel 
that the legislative decision is wrong in a given case. Raney 
v. Stovall, 361 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1962). 
Amicus respectfully submits that the Courts are without 
jurisdiction to hear or determine the subject matter raised 
-~ Jenkins v. State of ~tan and t~at. the determination of the 
qualifications of the legislators of this state is solely and 
exclusivelv within the jurisdiction of the respective houses 
c: the leglslatur~. 
CONCLUSIONS 
l. Plaintiff has no standing to bring this suit. 
2. There was no proper party defendant as the State of 
Utah has immunity and the State of Utah, as such, is not the 
-21-
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real party in interest to defend the right of educators 
to serve in the legislature. 
3. School teachers and educators are not "officers" 
within the prohibition of the meaning of Article VI, 
Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah. 
4. The Constitution of Utah specifically reserves to 
each House of the Legislature the authority to determine 
the election and qualifications of its membership. 
5. The real impetus for this suit is the problem it 
creats in marketing the state's bonds. Amicus suggests 
that the Court hold that even if Plaintiff could show that 
certain members of the legislature were not properly quali-
fied, the determination by the legislature that its members 
were elected and qualified is conclusive and the laws enacted 
by the legislature were lawfully enacted and not void by the 
reasons suggested by Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1978. 
-22-
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